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To the student of economics, the aspects of labor 
should be very important. Labor plays a very important 
role in our economy and should be studied with great care 
and in detail. In studying labor we will encounter the 
"labor problem" which is so prevalent in our present day. 
You can hardly pick up the newspaper or read maga­
zines without encountering some aspects of the "labor 
problem." If one continues to follow the labor news he 
will discover not one, but many labor problems. A bus 
union may strike, tying up transportation to a major 
degree; unemployment may plague one city while another 
suffers from a labor shortage; an employee may believe 
that profit sharing may solve the labor problem; an ex­
plosion traps 10 coal miners; a statistician reports 
that wages are rising, and all of these could be extended 
before they would cover all the types of labor problems. 
In common with other areas of the social sciences, 
labor problems face the difficulty that they cannot be 
analysed under laboratory conditions. In consequence it 
is difficult to trace or prove cause-and-effeet relation-
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ships, and most generalizations within the field reflect 
the opinions of careful observers rather than scientific 
laws. This does not mean that inductive studies are 
lacking. Many excellent ones have been made that utilize 
controlled sampling and statistical techniques of eval­
uation, but they deal largely with the details upon which 
informed opinions must be based, rather than with broad 
conclusions of general interest. 
At this point, the writer wishes to say that in 
pursuing his problem he will use informed opinions rather 
than broad conclusions of the general interest. These 
opinions will be the opinions of the experts. 
Statement Of The Problem 
The problem of this paper lies within the effects 
of large controlled, coordinated and influential labor 
groups upon our economy. These large labor groups re­
ferred to may be called "unions". This paper is restricted 
to one large labor group which is said to be one of the 
largest in the world. The labor group referred to is 
the AFL-CIO. The AFL and the CIO merged in 1955 and have 
caused much controversy as to what effects will result. 
The problem of this paper is to determine what are 
the actual economic effects of the AFL-CIO merger. An 
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attempt will be made to l ist  various predicted effects 
of the merger and analyze each to determine i ts actual 
validity. These will be compared to the actual effects 
of the merger up to the present, and a brief look into 
the future will be discussed. 
It  is felt  that before one can really understand 
and grasp the contents of this investigative paper, a 
brief look into the historical background of unions is 
needed. T0  facilitate this, a brief look at early unions 
will be taken. 
Early Unionism 
The history of trade-unionism in the United States 
is frequently dated from 1792, when a local union was 
formed by the journeymen cordwainers (shoemakers) of 
Philadelphia. There were others such as the carpenters, 
printers, bakers, and tailors which formed organizations 
of their crafts.  
These early unions were composed of skilled or 
strategically located workers. In fact throughout his­
tory, this group has always been the first to organize. 
"Those who by reason of skill  or stra­
tegic location can exert pressure or inflict 
a loss by withdrawing their services, have the 
ability to secure employer recognition long 1 
before their less favorably located workers." 
I 
G. F. Bloom and>-H. B. Northrap, Economics of Labor 
and Industrial Relations (Philadelphia: The Blakiston 
Co., 1950), p. 22. 
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These early unions did not engage in collective 
bargaining as we are familiar with it today. Ihe unions 
would post its prices and announce the wages and working 
conditions for which its members would work. If the em­
ployer refused to meet the union's wishes, a strike would 
ensue, and necessitate a compromise being worked out. 
The custom of joint employer-employee conferences devel­
oped slowly. 
After the development of city federations of local 
unions came the national unions. "The first national 
union which has had a continous existence up to the pre­
sent time is the International Typographical Union, 
2 
founded in 1850." After the national unions we had a 
federation of national unions. The first federation of 
national unions which had a continous existence up to 
the present time is the American Federation of Labor, 
founded in 1886, 
There have been other forms of organizations tried 
during the history of unionism. There have been attempts 
to combine people from different trades and industries 
into a single local union, and to combine "mixed locals" 
into- all-inclusive national organization. An example of 
2 
Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor 
Relations (New Jersey: _Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 92. 
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this type of action was demostrated by the Knights of 
Labor which will be discussed later. There have been 
attempts to merge federations also. This was finally 
done in December of 1955 when the AFL and CIO merged. 
In discussing early unions we will find obstacles 
that influenced the decline of union growth at various 
times. There were doctrines originated to check union 
power and fight it. No other doctrines have gained 
more popularity and demostrated attempts to check or 
destroy unions than the "Conspiracy Doctrine" and the 
"Restraint of Trade Doctrine". These two doctrines 
had a definite adverse effect on unions during their 
existence. 
The Conspiracy Doctrine 
The basic theory of the "Conspiracy Doctrine" is 
that a lawful act when done by an individual may be un­
lawful when it is the result of a concerted agreement. 
For example, it has been held that it was legal for an 
individual worker to ask for an increase in wages. When 
individuals combine, however, for the purpose of demand­
ing a wage increase, courts during the early history of 
trade unions often ruled that the combination of workers 
was in itself a violation of the law. In general, ac­
cording to common law^ courts tend to hold that a com-
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bination of individuals is legal if the purpose is the 
benefit of the members of the group. But if  the pur­
pose is the injury of the employer, the organization 
was i l legal.  Where the organization undertakes to ac­
complish a purpose that is legal by employing all  i l­
legal means, any act of the organization itself is de­
clared illegal and individual members become liable for 
the actions of the group. In a given case the question 
to be settled is whether the act of a labor organiza­
tion is for the purpose of gaining a benefit for the 
workers or of injuring the employer. And since a union 
may feel that i t  can gain i ts point only by inflicting 
financial loss on an employer, the court must decide 
whether the loss to the employer or the benefit to be 
gained by the workers is of the greater importance. 
The Restraint of Trade Doctrine 
According to the "Restraint of Trade Doctrine", 
any contract that restrains trade is against public 
policy and is unenforceable. Moreover, when persons 
combine to effect an agreement that will restrain trade, 
the combination may be regarded as a criminal con­
spiracy. At common law a combination for the purpose 
of peacefully persuading an employer to grant an in­
crease in wages was usually allowed to be legal.  But 
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if the purpose was to coerce him, by using "unreason­
able" means, such as a strike, picketing, or a boycott, 
the combination was held to be a conspiracy in restraint 
of trade. What was the reasonable in any case, of course, 
depended upon the judgement of the court. 
These two common-law principles or doctrines played 
a major role in judicial decisions effecting labor. In 
a number of cases brought againist trade-unions during 
the nineteenth century, any sort of union activity was 
held to be a criminal conspiracy punishable by fine or 
imprisonment. The legality of trade-unionism remained 
in considerable doubt until the case of Commonwealth 
verses Hunt, decided in 18^2. In this case it was ruled 
that union activities were not unlawful per se, their 
legality depended rather on the objectives which they 
were designed to attain. Prom this time onward, the 
doctrine that any union is a criminal conspiracy fell 
Increasingly out of favor. 'The thinking of judges was 
310 doubt influenced by the fact that unions continued 
to grow despite judicial disapproval. 
CHAPTER II 
THE RISE CP NATIONAL UNIONS 
The beginnings of local unionism around the year 
1800 have been discussed. These locals soon found that 
they were relatively weak when compared to a strong 
employer. Consisting of workers in only one trade, with 
limited funds and no outside support, they often crumbled 
when forced to strike against a large employer or em­
ployer association. The need for some kind of defensive 
alliance with other unions was felt almost from the 
beginning. 
There are two ways that such an alliance can be 
formed. The local may join with local unions of other 
trades in the same area to form city-wide or state-wide 
organization; or it may join with other local unions in 
the same trade or industry to form national trade-unions. 
The first efforts were in the former direction. "City-
wide federations, called at the time "trade assemblies" 
sprang up in Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore in 
1 
1833, and in ten other cities during the next two years." 
— 
Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor 
Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 6b. 
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The main function of these groups was to give mutual 
aid in strikes. Their funds were obtained by taxing each 
local so many cents per member per month, and the tax 
was sometimes increased to meet emergency situations. A 
local wishing to go on strike usually had to secure ap­
proval from either the majority or by two thirds of the 
members of the locals. They had to do this to be able 
to draw strike benefits from the common fund. The trade 
assemblies also functioned as boycott organizations, 
lobbyists, propaganda bureaus, publishers of labor news­
papers; and in some cities sponsored an independent 
labor party. The usefulness of city federations is proved 
by the fact that they have persisted, with some change 
of function, to the present day. 
It may be asked why was it necessary for the local 
unions to go beyond this and establish national unions 
of their respective trades and industries? One reason 
is said to have been the nationalization of the market 
for many goods. It has also been said that union organi­
zation tend to parellel the organization of industry. 
In an industry in which employers compete on a national 
basis, the isolated local soon finds itself competing 
with local unions in other plants of the industry. In 
this sort of competition, wages tend to level down to 
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the lowest rates provailing anywhere in the country. 
National unions date for all practical purposes 
from the Civil War. Two so-called national unions of 
shoemakers and printers were formed in 1835-36, but 
they were confined to the Alantic coast and were wiped 
out almost immediately by depression. Three permanent 
organizations appeared during the fifties; the printers 
(1850), molders (1859), and machinists and blacksmiths 
(1859)« The first period of intensive national organi­
zation, however, was from 1863 to 1873. During these 
years some twenty-six new national unions were formed, 
many of which have survived to the present day. "The 
present unions of locmotive engineers, locomotive fire­
men, carpenters, cigar makers, bricklayers, and painters 
2 
date from this period." 
The national unions shoxred much more resistance to 
depression than the earlier local unions. The depres­
sion of 1873-80 caused a great decline in union member­
ship, but at least eleven national unions are known to 
have survived these years and eight new national unions 
were formed during the depression. 
The national unions not only survived, but gradually 
took over more and more functions from the local and the 
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city federations. They began to build up war chests to 
aid in financing strikes. To prevent dissipation of 
these funds, it was necessary to f orbid local unions to 
call strikes without the approval of the national union. 
The national officers thus became involved in all im­
portant disputes between local unions and employers, with 
a view of preventing strikes except where absolutely 
necessary. Prom this it was natural for national officers 
to begin participating in the negotiating of new con­
tracts with employers. This action, was desirable also 
in order to keep some reasonable relation among the 
schedules and other contract terms secured by the var­
ious locals. 
It was natural also for the national officers with 
an intimate knowledge of the trade or industry to take 
over the work of organizing new locals. The great ma­
jority of full-time union organizers now draw their pay 
from the treasuries of the national unions. The benefit 
functions of the unions also became centralized in the 
national office. Union rules for sickness benefits, 
death benefits, strike benefits, and other types of pay­
ments were established throughout the union, and funds 
were paid to the national treasurer and were disbursed 
by him. 
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The expanding functions of the national unions 
tended to transfer the loyalty of local unions from the 
city federation to the national union of their trade. 
Most workers naturally have a sense of closer kinship 
with other members in their own trade or industry. This 
feeling was reinforced by the benefits received from the 
national organizations. Dues paid to the national unions 
and cash benefits received from it soon amounted to many 
times the amounts paid to the city federations. 
The cornerstone of the trade-union today are the 
great national unions. The largest unions, all with 
membership in excess of one hundred throusand, had a 
total membership in 1952 of about twelve million, or 
about three-quarters of all organized workers. These 
unions are of greater significance than the federations 
based upon them. 
Federation of these national unions dates from the 
1880's. Several attempts at federation of national unions 
were made in earlier years. There was the National Labor 
Union, which flourished during the post-Civil War depres­
sion of 1866-1870. Its conventions were composed mainly 
of delegates from local unions, city federations, and 
labor political clubs. In such a heterogeneous group, 
discussions centered on political action. The movement 
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attained some local sucesses, but collapsed in 1872 
after a national convention nominated Judge Davis for 
the presidency. Judge Davis declined too late for a 
new nomination to be made, and this led to the death 
of the already weak organization. 
There have been three important federations devot­
ing themselves to trade-union objectives. These three 
important federations are the Knights of Labor, the 
American Federation of ̂ abor, and the Congress of In­
dustrial Organizations. 
The Knights of Labor 
Organized in 1869 as a secret society by Uriah 
Stephens, a Philadelphia garment cutter, the Knights of 
Labor grew slowly at first. Considerable uneasiness was 
caused when the appearance in public places of strange 
symbols, including five stars standing for the union's 
name, would bring hundreds of workmen together. Al­
though intended to protect the men against employer 
persecution, the mystery exposed the organization to mis­
representation and did more harm than good, so that in 
1878 the element of secrecy was dropped. Thereafter 
membership grew rapidly, reaching 100,000 in 1885. 
Finally the union forced that shewd financier, Jay Gould, 
to treat with it in order to avert strikes on the Wasbash 
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and the Missouri Pacific railroads. The effect of the 
victory was electrifying: "membership skyrocketed to 
730,000 by the following year, making the Knights the 
most imposing labor union in the country had ever known." 
The ideals of the Knights were very high. 
"They looked forward to the end of the 
wage system, but they were not socialists; 
rather they hoped to establish a new social 
order by means of co-operation and political 
action for the benefit of the workers. They 
wished to secure for the workers the full 
enjoyment of the wealth they create, suffi­
cient leisure in which to develop their in­
tellectual, moral, and social faculties, all 
the benefits, recreation, and pleasure of 
association. To obtain these they demanded, 
among other things, the establishment of 
bureaus of labor statistics, reservation of 
public lands for actual settlers, the repeal 
of unequal lavrs, a weekly payday, mechanic's 
lien laws, abolition of the contract system 
of labor on public works, substitution of 
arbitration for strikes, prohibition of the 
employment of children under fourteen years 
of age, the eight-hour day, etc.; but the 
cardinal principles remained always union, 
education, and producers' co-operation." 
The Knights sought to realize the ideal of one big 
union and aimed to bring into organization all produc­
tive labor using the strenght of the skilled, and mobi-
3 
S. Perlman, A History of Trade Unionism in the 
United States (New York: MacMillan Co., 1952), p. 273. 
4 
S. L. Bogart and D. L. Kemmever, Economic History 
of the American People (New York: Longman, Green and 
Co., 1953), p. 517. 
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lizing the unskilled so that their competition would not 
hurt the skilled. Most of the authority rested at the 
top of the organization. The lowest unit was the local 
assembly, usually made up of about a dozen workers of 
one trade. Next came the District Assembly in which 
numerous trades were represented and which had complete 
authority over i ts locals. Above i t  was the General As­
sembly, the highest tribunal, and when i t  was not in 
session its power rested in the hands of the General 
Executive Board headed by a Grand Master Workman. By 
1886 the Knights were losing their importance in the 
labor world. The reasons for this rapid decline after 
1886 may be summed up under four heads. 
(1) Despite their early abhorrence of strikes they 
engaged in a number of large ones for which they were 
unprepared..  This of course hurt them in the workers'  
eyes. The ease with which they called one sympathetic 
strike after another with l i t t le regard to the strategic 
importance of the groups selected did more harm than 
good. 
( 2 )  T h e  K n i g h t s  u n c o m p r o m i s i n g  a t t i t u d e  a n d  s o m e t i m e  
violent methods lost them public support.  The sabotage 
connected with the Southwestern railroad strike in 1886 
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made an impression on the public mind second only to 
that of the destructive railroad strike of 1887, and this 
was merely the most outstanding of many Knight strikes 
at that time. On top came the bomb throwing episode in 
Haymarket Square, Chicago, during a renewed eight-hour 
movement. Although it xvas not known who had done this, 
eight anarchists were arrested for inciting the outrage, 
and when one proved to be a Knight and his local assembly 
would not expel him, many people condemned the whole 
order. 
(3) Many failures occured in the co-operative 
enterprises of the Order. Some 200 co-operative ven­
tures were undertaken, chiefly in cooperage, shoemaking, 
and mining, the best known being the coal mine at 
Cannelburg, Indiana. The average investment was $10,000 
and the losses were heavy. 
(4) Most important was the breakdown of the feeling 
of solidarity among the different types of members. The 
mixed assemblies possessed little in common, and the 
vague ideals of brotherhood were not powerful enough to 
bind the workers from diverse industries into a unified 
body for action. In fact, between the skilled and un­
skilled there developed at times a positive animosity 
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because the skilled workers realized that they were 
strategically more important in winning a strike than 
the replaceable unskilled workers and consequently 
resented sharing the gains if the strike was a success 
or were bitter if the strike failed. Add to this the 
success of the compact craft unions outside the Order in 
winning their strikes, and it becomes apparent why after 
1886 the skilled workers in both industrial and craft 
unions drifted more and more into the new American 
Federation of Labor. 
The American Federation of Labor 
While the Knights of Labor was achieving its great 
boom, a group of trade union leaders met in 1881 and 
formed what was first called the Federation of Organized 
Trades and Labor Unions and then, after 1886, the Ameri­
can Federation of Labor, About twenty-five trades were 
represented at this time, including carpenters and joiners, 
cigar makers, furniture makers, iron molders, miners and 
mine laborers, and typesetters. The Federation grew 
rapidly. Much of the Federation's success must be at­
tributed to the leadership of Samuel Gompers, an Snglish-
born immigrant of Gutch-Jewish descent and a cigar maker 
by trade, who was president from 1886 to his death in 
18 
1924, with the exception of one year. Adolph Strasser 
of the Cigar Makers'  Union was also an important figure 
in the AP of L. 
The chief purposes of the Federation were to unite 
the various unions for mutual assistance, to obtain 
legislation favorable to the interests of the working 
classes, to use every possible means to remedy abuses 
from xvhich workers suffered, and to improve their work­
ing conditions. In carrying out this program the Fede­
ration maintained that the strike, the boycott,  and the 
unfair l ist  were justifiable and necessary methods in 
achieving i ts ends. 
The philosophy of the AFL leaders was a pragmatic 
one, grounded in the principles of American capitalism. 
They were out to improve the conditions of those whom 
they represented and they represented the skilled workers 
who, because of their strategic location, had the bar­
gaining power sufficient to command employer recognition. 
It  consistently attempted to raise the standards of 
living by shorter working hours, higher wages, and better 
working conditions. Gompers prided himself on being a 
realist,  disapproved of political entanglements, avoided 
the sympathetic strike, and was generally conservative. 
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He believed that the betterment of labor's conditions 
by short stages, as opportunities arose, would be more 
lasting. 
The organization of the Federation differed markedly 
from that of the Knights. The loitfest unit was the local 
union, whose members were all of one trade, say cigar 
making; then all the cigar-making locals were organized 
into one national union, and finally the American Fede­
ration of Labor united all nationals. The system was 
modeled after our own government, with each national 
union playing the part of a state. It is true that there 
were central and state organizations, but they were of 
secondary importance and often temporary. The Federation 
was thus merely a loose grouping of practically self-
governing national or local unions, which were largely 
independent of one another. The members of one local 
affiliated union might strike and those of another might 
continue to work in the same plant. Only matters of 
general interest came before the Federation's officers. 
Authority was highly decentralized and the Federation 
was held together largely by the recognition of each 
union's independence plus the assurance that the Federa­
tion would admit no rival union of the same trade. 
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At first the unions making up the American Federa­
tion of Labor contained the skilled members of a parti­
cular craft or trade, and largely neglected the un­
skilled. But as the machine methods destroyed the value 
of special skill or the need of training for a particular 
craft, and as industrial combinations brought together 
under one management various branches of an industry, 
the power and importance of the older type of self-suf­
ficient or seperate trade union was threatened. Some 
of the unions within the AFL, while not yet approving 
the idea of one big union sought to organize all workers 
in their industries; such were the coal miners, the 
brewery workers, and others. 
Samuel Gompers held on to his post until he died. 
"He was replaced by William Green a native of a mining 
5 
community in Ohio." Green held the office of the pre­
sident until and after the group of industrial minded 
workers split from the AFL and formed the CIO. 
Congress Of Industrial Organization 
The C.I.O. came into being when the majority of the 
A.F. of L. delegates at the annual convention in Alantic 
r ~ ~~ 
G. F. Bloom and H. R. Northrup, Economics of Labor 
and Industrial Relations (Philadelphia: The Blakiston 
Co., 1950), p. *K>. 
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City in 1935 voted against the organization of workers 
along industrial lines in massproduction industries. 
A large minority revolted and founded the C.I.O on 
November 10, 1935* with eight of the unions and one mil­
lion members. "The argument for industrial unionism was 
led by Lewis of the Mine Workers, supported by Hilman of 
the Clothing workers, Dubinsky of the Ladies' Garment 
6 
Workers, and Howard of the Typographical Union." John 
L. Lewis, head of the United Mine Workers, the largest 
constituent union, became president. Most of the other 
unions were from the textile trade. The C.I.O. had the 
same kind of federal framework as the A.F. of L., the 
chief structural difference was the organization of local 
unions by industry instead of by craft. Partisans of 
industrial and craft methods of organization hurled ar­
guments at American labor and the public for many months. 
The A.F. of L. leaders said that the C.I.O. leaders were 
guilty of dual unionism, a high form of labor treason 
because it means divided forces where there should be 
a unified front before the employer. The C.I.O. leaders 
replied that the reactionary element in the A. F. of L. 
was itself guilty for prohibiting industrial unionism 
—.—£ 
Lloyd G. Reynolds .--Labor Economics and Labor 
Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 86. 
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and would rather wreck organized labor than lose control.  
Graft organization was archaic in a factory economy, 
they insisted, and was the reason why only one-tenth of 
the xvorking population was enrolled in unions after two 
generations of the A.P. of L. Within another two years 
the C.I.O. had partially organized the automobile, steel,  
oil ,  and rubber industries and boasted 32 national unions 
and 3,700,000 members. 
The methods and conduct of the unions in this new 
giant.organization sometimes showed more spirit  and in­
genuity than respect for the law. Rejoicing in their 
new-found strength, the unskilled workers and semi­
skilled workers were anxious to make up for lost time. 
The head office had difficulty controlling the national 
union leaders and these in turn were sometimes unable to 
restrain the enthuasiasm of their membership. Public 
opinion, although sympathetic toward the workers, was 
repeatedly shocked by the new union's excesses. A 
brief look into the General Motors strike of 1937 will 
serve as an illustration. 
The Detroit sit-down strike. Most of the workers 
in the automobile industry were barely semi-skilled, 
since four out of every five jobs could be learned 
23 
within two weeks. But life on the assembly line was 
dull and very wearing. Some were unable to stand the 
pace and complained that it was constantly being speeded 
up. Numerous labor spies made organization hazardous, 
and company policy based on the strategy of "divide and 
rule" encouraged dissention among the unions that did 
exist. After the "New Deal" began, the United Automobile 
Workers, which was at first an A.P. of L. industrial 
union, grew in power, then deserted. The C.I.O., put on 
a vigorous organizing campaign under the leadership of 
Homer Martin, and in December, 1936, endeavored to ne­
gotiate with company officials for recognition and 
certain concessions. When the officials refused to ne­
gotiate, a strike began at a Fisher Body plant and spread. 
The workers just sit down in the factories and refused 
to move; their attitude being that they were protecting 
their jobs. The corporation stressed that the men were 
trespassing, often destroying property, and preventing 
the operation of valuable equipment whose enforced idle­
ness was very costly. A court ordered the men to vacate, 
but was not enforced largely owing to Govenor Murphy of 
Michigan, who feared there would be bloodshed. Instead 
he tried to secure a settlement and at last succeeded. 
2k 
The strike was won; the union achieved recognition, a 
survey of speed-up abuses was agreed to, time and one-
half for overtime tvas to prevail, and there was to be no 
discrimination against unionists. 
The sit-down strike was novel and highly effective 
at a time when the union needed victories to give the 
membership self-confidence. It was declared illegal in 
the Fansteel case of 1938, but the C.I,0« strikes con­
tinued to exist. 
Not all members of unions belong to either the A.F. 
of L. or the C.I.O. Since 191^ approximately one unionist 
in five to one in ten has not. Most famous of the in­
dependent unions are the Big Four Railway Brotherhoods; 
the engineers, firemen, conductors, and trainmen. Other 
railway workers have independent unions, as do also a 
few groups in manufacturing and a considerable number 
of workers in the government service, particularly in 
the post-office department. Finally, between 19^2, when 
John L. Lewis led his United Mine Workers out of the 
C.I.O. , and 19^-6 when he led them back to the A.F. of L., 
that great union of ^00,000 members was an independent 
organization. 
CHAPTER III 
THE APL-CIO MERGER 
Factors Leading to The Merger 
One of the most important events in American history 
took place in New York City1s vast 71st Regiment Armory 
on the morning of Monday, December 5, 1955• It w^s 
then that the United American Federation of Labor and 
Congress of Industrial Organizations was brought into 
being. 
On several occasions, negotiating committees of high 
AFL and CIO officials were appointed with the objective 
of working out terms for a merger of the two unions. 
All of these negotiation attempts had resulted in failure 
until 1955- "One major obstacle was the extensive over-
1 
lapping of jurisdictions between AFL and CIO unions." 
There was the realization that unification required con­
siderable merging of various national unions and size­
able transfers of membership from one union to another. 
Labor leaders of the various unions were uneasy as to 
just how they and their organizations would come out 
- — 
Lloyd G. Reynolds, Labor Economics and Labor 
Relations (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1956), p. 92. 
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in such a reorganization. 
One of the most important steps toward union unity 
between the AFL and CIO came in 1952, when President 
Philip Murray of the CIO and William Green of the AFL 
died within a few months of each other. George Meany 
and Walter Buether xrere elected presidents of the APL 
and CIO respectively and quickly began discussions look­
ing toward a possible merger of the two groups. They 
were not successful at first but they did formulate a 
"no-raiding agreement" in 1953# 
The merger has aroused a great deal of curiosity 
as to why it occured when it did, after the committees 
on unity which had been meeting off and on over many 
years had previously been unsuccessful in agreeing even 
on the first steps toward uniting. It also aroused 
fears in the minds of some, particularly in the ranks 
of management, that the new giant organization would 
emerge as a labor monopoly, and would perhaps prove to 
be the nucleus for the labor party. 
There was actually no single reason leading to the 
merger but rather a complex of reasons which, taken 
together, made such a move not only feasible in 1955, 
where previously it had proved impossible, but in im-
2? 
portant respects, imperative,, First, let us look at 
some of the obstacles which made unity impossible at 
first but which by 1955 had been removed. 
In its initial formation, the Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (originally the Committee for Industrial 
Organization) had split off from the parent AFL on the 
issue of how the unorganized workers should be brought 
into the labor movement. 'This issue was important in 
view of the support which the New Deal government had 
given to unionization in the National Relations Act, 
after the Senator from New York who fathered it. This 
act gave enforceable rights to workers to form unions, 
unmolested by employer opposition. 
The protection afforded by the act provided the 
unions with an unparalleled opportunity to expand their 
memberships. At the time the act was passed the total 
number of unionized workers was no more than 4 million, 
including those in independent unions. The organizing 
potential was great. In the vast mass-production in­
dustries, where unionism barely had a toe hold, the 
question arose, how should the AFL set about bringing 
workers into unions? 
The AFL was controlled, at the top, by the president 
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of the powerful craft unions in the building and metal 
trades. These officials insisted that t-jorkers pos­
sessing skills and training which had been traditionally 
represented by their unions should be enrolled in their 
unions, regardless of the industry in which they were 
working. This was known as the craft doctrine. 
There was a significant opposition to this policy 
within the AFL. Other powerful leaders of national 
unions, although outnumbered by the craft leaders, ad­
vocated the formation of unions on an industry basis, 
without regard to craft. The thinking behind this ap­
proach was that modern technology had made craft juris­
dictions obsolete. It was the belief of these industry-
oriented labor leaders that a craft approach would mean 
that the labor movement would forever remain a small 
body of the aristocracy of skilled workers, having no 
interest in and holding out no promise to the larger 
segment of American workmen who failed to meet or fit 
within the traditional craft definitions. 
Finally, finding no support in AFL policy, the 
small group of union leaders who held to the industrial-
union philosophy, with John L. Lewis of the United Mine 
Workers as their spokesman, set up a committee to promote 
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industrial organization. 'Their action was held a 
violation of the APL federation policy and they were 
finally dismissed from the APL when they refused to 
stop this sort of action. Thus the CIO was born. 
After this both federations set about organizing 
efforts. In the production industry it became evident 
that the industrial philosphy was more appropriate than 
the craft philosophy. The United Auto Workers, the 
United Bubber Workers, the United Steel Workers, and 
United Electrical Workers grew large in a short period 
of time. 
The APL finding themselves in contests with the 
new CIO over the enrolling of new members, was driven 
to make room for the workers without skills, in whom 
they had previously little interest. Craft became a 
nucleus for organizing, but ceased to serve as the only 
basis for organization. Thus there began to grow with 
in the APL an industry-mindedness different from that 
of the CIO only in degree. 
The effect of this development was to eliminate 
the craft-verses-industry issue as a basis for divis­
ion. This issue still remains alive, though not as 
vigorous as it once was, within the merged federation; 
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but it ceased to be an issue distinguishing one federa­
tion from the other. At the time of the merger, the 
APL brought more industrial unions to the new organi­
zation than did the CIO. Thus one deterrent to the 
merger had been eliminated by 1955. 
A second barrier which fell by the wayside by 1955 
was the stereotypes which each of the two labor groups 
had built up of the other over the years. To the APL, 
the CIO unions were for a long time regarded as Com­
munist infiltrated. To the CiO, the APL unions were 
regarded as racketridden. These charges were in some 
measure true. 
'"The new CIO was in need of organizers 
and the Communists offered to supply them. 
Against the warning advice of David, uubinsky, 
Lewis accepted their assistance and thousands 
of CIO lobs were filled via the Communist 
Party."z 
The CIO in 19^9 and 1950 set about to clean its 
house of Communists by expelling eleven unions which 
were found to be Communist-dominated. 
"When the International Longshoreman's 
association refused to clean out its racke­
teering practices following the widespread 
publicity given them by New York officials, 
the ILA was expelled from the AFL."3 
~ g ~ 
G.P. Bloom and H.R. Northrup, Economics of Labor 
and Industrial Belations (Philadelphia: The Blakiston 
Co., 1950), p. 49. 
3 
Alfred Kuhn, Labor Institutions and Economics 
(New York: Rinehart and Co., Inc., 1956), p. 77. 
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Thus each federation took decisive actions which 
helped to dispel the stereotypes which each had built 
of the other. 
There was a need for more than the removal of the 
previous deterrents to unify to bring about the merger. 
There was a need for some positive incentives. 
In 1952, when William Green president of the AFL, 
died and George Meany took over the job, there was some 
stirring among other union officials who help personal 
aspirations. About this same time Philip Murray died 
and Walter Ruether took over the CIO. 
"Within the AFL Meany faced a problem 
posed by Dave Beck, president of the Team­
sters, who gave evidence of intending to 
set off on a giganic organizing campaing 
that would seem almost certain to bring him 
into conflict with other unions within the 
federation. The Teamsters, largest organi­
zation in the AFL, was also one of the most 
strategic. Its cooperation was frequently 
sought by other unionists. Its willingness 
to respect picket lines was at times es­
sential to the effectiveness of strikes 
called by other unions. With members in 
more than fifty major industry groups, its 
ambitions posed a threat to the security and 
independence of other unions. Beck as 
president had been consorting with David 
McDonald, president of the Steel-Workers, 
and Lewis, president of the Miners; and 
rumors had sprung up that they were plott­
ing a third federation. If the Teamsters 
were to pull out of the AFL and start an 
opposition labor group, there would be 
trouble for the AFL and its new president. 
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If they stayed, there could still be trouble. 
Beuther in the CIO faced at least equal 
difficulty. The same McDonald who had been 
holding conversations with Beck and Lewis had 
intimated from time to time that he and his 
Steelworkers might disaffiliate from the CIO. 
His personal rivalry with Beuther was well 
known. It could be expected that he would 
have enjoyed Beuther's discomfiture at being 
left head of a CIO that at one stroke had 
lost almost one-fourth of its membership. 
Moreover, there was some possibility that 
McDonald might have taken other CIO unions 
along with him. Reuther, himself justfiably 
ambitious, would have been left in charge of 
a shadow of the former CIO, his prestige 
perhaps irretrievably damaged. 
With each federation president thus 
faced with internal problems, it seems na­
tural that the thoughts of each should turn 
more on merger. With a pooling of the 
strength of both groups, the merged organi­
zation could better withstand whatever di­
visive action might be taken by the Team­
sters or the Steelworkers. In unity there 
lay strength. Moreover, the personalities 
of the two federations presidents favored the 
effort. Each was idealistic in his aims, 
dedicated to the labor movement and labor's 
welfare, whatever other ambitions each might 
harbor for himself; each recognized that the 
future held grave problems for the survival 
and expansion of unionism, which could be 
more effectively met by joint action rather 
than by seperate and sometimes conflicting 
stands. Unity made sense." 
There was the contention that if the top leaders 
were removed from the scene and if negotiations for the 
merger could be left to the rank and file, unity xrould 
_ _ 
N. W. Chamberlain, Labor (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1958), pp. 57-5B. 
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come quickly. The reasoning behind this was that a 
strong sympathy for a single movement which would sweep 
aside the forces obstructing the merger. But the re­
verse proved to be true. Although in many communities 
and cities cooperation between the two groups had been 
going on for years. 
"There appears to have been relatively 
little rank-and-file sentiment behind the 
merger, and although in some communities co­
operation between the two groups had been 
going on for years, in most cities and states 
the problem of effecting a unity in the field 
posed problems which many local leaders found 
distastedful. The real pressure for merger 
came from the top."5 
These were the major factors leading to the merger 
which took place at the merger convention. 
The Merger Convention 
On Monday, December 5> 1955 > at  9^30 o'clock the 
first constitutional convention of the AFL-CIO was 
called to order Jointly by President George Meany of 
the American Federation of Labor and Walter Reuther 
of the Congress of Industrial Organizations. This con­
vention took place in New York City's vast 71st Regi­
ment Armory. 
Walter Reuther acted as temporary chairman and 
declared the convention in order for business. The 
• -  -
Ibid..  p. 58. 
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National Anthems of the United States and Canada were 
sung and all remained standing while the invocation 
was delivered. 
The delegates and guests took their seats and tem­
porary Chairman Reuther introduced four outstanding 
New Yorkers. Each of the New Yorkers warmly welcomed 
the convention. 
Mayor Robert F. Wagner, son of the late Senator 
Wagner, addressed the convention also. He extended his 
best wishes for the success of the union for the better­
ment of America and the world. 
After Mayor Wagner completed his speech, Temporary 
Chairman Reuther asked all members of the Joint Unity 
Committee to rise. He hailed them as the people who 
had worked hard in bringing the AFL-CIO where it x^as 
today and had really been the architects of this begin­
ning of a united labor movement. Then with appropriate 
remarks, Mr. Reuther yielded the gavel to Harry C. dates, 
a veteran of American trade unionism. Mr. Gates gave 
a short speech and then introduced Walter Reuther for 
his formal address to the convention. 
Mr. Reuther1s address was one mostly dedicated to 
the unity of the two organizations. He stated clearly 
just how his organization would contribute faithfully 
to this new organization. This points can be seen in 
hisspeech when he said: 
"All of us are truly blessed in having 
the great human experience of sharing in the 
shaping of the decisions of this historic 
convention. In truth we stand on the thres­
hold of the beginning of what I know villi 
be the most glorious chapter in the history 
of the American labor movement. 
I say to George Meany and our many 
friends who make up the leadership of the 
former American Federation of Labor unions, 
and I say this in behalf of myself and my 
colleagues and for the millions of workers 
back home whom vie have the privilege of 
representing. I say, George, to you and 
your colleagues we extend the hand of fel­
lowship, and I say, together, united in 
the solidarity of human brotherhood, we 
shall go forviard to build a labor movement 
and a better America for all people in this 
great and wonderful country of ours. 
I say to George Meany: George, this is 
a great nevi beginning. You will lead the 
American labor movement to higher and higher 
levels of achievement. You will enable the 
labor movements to make a greater and greater 
contribution to the world of America and the 
free world. And I pledge to you, George, 
with all of my heart, that those of us who 
share in the leadership of the CIO shall 
stand with you, and together with your col­
leagues from the AFL we shall fight together, 
we shall march together, and we shall win 
together that better tomorrow for the 
American people."" 
William F. Schnitzler of the Joint Labor Unity 
g _ _ 
"The Merger Convention", American Federalist. 
Vol. 63 No. 1, January, 1956, pp. 5,6,8. 
36 
Committee, acting as the convention's Credentials com­
mittee gave the report as to hovr many delegates were 
eligible to be seated in the first constitutional con­
vention and recommended that they be seated forthwith. 
The report of the Credentials Committee was adopted 
unanimously. 
Temporary Chairman Beuther then recognized James 
B. Carey, president of the International Union of 
Electrical, Radio and Machine Worker. Mr. Carey then 
read the report of the Joint Unity Committee setting 
forth proposed rules and order of business for the 
convention. They were approved by the delegates. 
David McDonald, president of the United Steel Workers 
of America, in an address to the convention on behalf of 
the Joint Unity Committee, expressed his feeling of the 
pride in being able to make this report dealing with 
steps which had culminated in the achievement of the 
APL-CIO merger. 
For the Joint APL-CIO Unity Committee, Mr. McDonald 
then submitted the following resolution: 
"Be It Resolved, That this initial con­
stitutional convention of the American Federa­
tion of Labor and Congress of Industrial Or­
ganizations confirms and ratifies the action 
of the seperate conventions of the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations in ratifying, approving and 
adopting the resolution on the achievement 
for the merger of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza­
tions, the implemention agreement and the 
constitution of the American Federation of 
Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza­
tions." ' 
This resolution was submitted to the delegates in 
a standing vote. The resolution was then adopted by 
the unanimous action of the convention. 
Mr. Reuther then yielded the chair to President 
Bates of the Bricklayers, who announced that nomina­
tions of officers were now in order. Mr. Reuther was 
given the first opportunity in the nomination of the 
president of the new organization. The election of 
officers were in the following manner. 
George Meany was elected president. William F. 
Schtizler was nominated secretary-treasurer. There 
were twenty-seven vice-presidents elected. 
Mr. Meany1s acceptance speech was one similar to 
that of Mr. Reuther in that it stressed unity and what 
the two organizations could do as a unit. He also ad­
vocated unity and exerted efforts to rid the new or­
ganization of past conflicts. This point is shown in 
his acceptance speech when he said: 
— 
Ibid.. p. 8. _ 
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"As we go forward together in this move­
ment, let us stop thinking in terms of prior 
labels. Let us make up our minds that from 
this moment on there is just one label on 
all the organizations and all of the member­
ship of this great organization, and that 
this label is AFL-CIO and nothing else. 
Let us apply this philosophy in terms of 
good faith, determination to live together, 
to work together and to think together for 
one united organization." 
All events up to this point were events of the first 
day of the convention. The second, was composed of 
mostly speeches by prominent figures. They included 
Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Thurgood Marshall, Gover­
nor Harriman of New York, and Marion Folson, Secretary 
of the Department of Health, Welfare and Education. 
The third, fourth and fifth day consisted of mostly 
discussing business of a formal nature. Finally at 
5:20 o'clock the afternoon of Thrusday, December 8, 1955, 
the first constitutional convention of the American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organiza­
tions, having completed its momentous work, slipped 
into history. 
How The AFL-CIO Functions 
The AFL-CIO is a federation of national and inter­
national unions. Each national union is fully autono-
- __ 
Ibid. . p. 1^-. _ 
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mous. Each carries on collective bargaining with 
employers; maintains its own headquarters; elect its 
own officers; maintains the staff needed for adminis­
tration and services; sets its own dues; provides the 
services its members need and want. 
The AFL-CIO holds biennial conventions which es­
tablish a general policy on economic, legislative and 
political matters. The convention also elects the of­
ficers of the AFL-CIO. The convention is the supreme 
governing body of the organization. 
The first president of the AFL-CIO is George beany, 
who was elected unanimously at the merger convention 
which established the AFL-CIO. Elected at the same time 
was the organization's first secretary-treasurer, 
William F. Schnitzler. 
The AFL-CIO has 27 vice presidents. The president, 
the secretary-treasurer and the 27 vice presidents con­
stitute the Executive Council, which is the official 
governing body of the organization between conventions. 
The AFL-CIO has two other official bodies-the 
Executive Committee and the General Board. The execu­
tive Committee is composed of the president, the 
secretary-treasurer and 6 vice presidents, elected by 
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the Executive Council. 
This group meets more often than the Executive 
Council and serves as an advisory group to the execu­
tive officers. 
The General Board is composed of the Executive 
Council plus one officer of each affiliated union and 
one officer of each of the six constitutional departments. 
The General Board meets annually to act upon matters 
referred to it by the Executive Council. 
The AFL-CIO, through its headquarters staff, pro­
vides services to the affiliated unions, in the fields 
of research, education, legal aid, public relations 
and other matters. It serves as the general representa­
tive of all the affiliated unions in appearances before 
Congress and in dealing with the various departments 
of the government. 
Through its field staff, the AFL-CIO aids affiliates 
and organizes workers into unions of their own choosing, 
giving recognition to the principle that both the craft 
and industrial are appropriate, equal and necessary as 
methods of union organization. 
The AFL-CIO has established, and is vigorously 
enforceing, a six-point program of ethical standards, 
designed to rid the labor'movements of racketeers. 
These Codes of Ethical Practices, based on the un-
vrc'itten law of the trade union movement, insist that 
union office funds are a public trust to be used only 
for the benefit of workers. Unions violating this code 
of honor face actions on the part of the federation. 
Unions are expected to observe these codes, which are 
the basic policy of the AFL-CIO. 
The APL-CIO has the following constitutionally 
established committees: Legislation, Civil Rights, 
Political Education, Ethical Practices, International 
Affairs, Education, Social Security, Economic Policy, 
Community Services, Housing, Research, Public Rela­
tions, Safety and Occupational Health, Veteran Affairs. 
The APL-CIO publishes a weekly newspaper, the 
AFL-CIO News; a monthly magazine, The AFL-CIO American 
Federalist; two monthly economic reports, Labor's 
Economic Review and Collective Bargaining Report. Some 
of the departments of the AFL-CIO issue specialized 
publications. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE EFFECTS OF THE MERGER 
It is obvious that the impact of the merger is un­
likely to be felt immediately by most Americans. But 
it is equally obvious that the mere existence of an 
organization with 15 million members, if it measures 
up to the hopes which have accompanied its creation, 
will have certain definite long-range effects. The 
confidence with which the AFL-CIO met, the sense of 
over-increasing maturity, and the very serious respon­
sibilities that its size and influence are certain to 
have a definite effect upon it. 
The illogical fear (of the critics of the merger) 
is that the merger will make the unions impregnable, 
with the give-and-take of bargaining completely elimi­
nated. The critics object not only to the merger of 
federations, but also to companywide bargaining and 
nationwide unions. They have often tried to build a 
case for application of the anti-trust laws, which were 
passed to regulate the empires of corporate monopoly, 
to labor unions. But labor is not a "giant trust". 
It remains, after the merger as before, a voluntary 
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association of autonomous unions. 
On the other hand, it cannot be said that nothing 
will change. Obviously there are advantages for unions 
in the merger of their federation, or the new federation 
would never have come into existence. 
In seeking to appraise the labor movement of the 
future, the problem is to look into various predictions 
as to what the merger will actually bring about and 
determine the validity of these predictions. 
The "Labor Monopoly" Charge 
Every since the news of the merger of the American 
Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organi­
zations was first announced it has been greeted with al­
most universal acclaim and optimism. 
Leaders from all segments of our national life have 
joined leaders of labor, speaking for 15 million working 
men and women, in heralding the newly achieved labor 
unity as a hopeful forward step, one which will advance 
the welfare of not only wage and salary earners, but 
the entire nation. 
Yet before the merger had been consummated, fear-
ridden voices were being raised against it, alleging 
that American trade unions*, which had long been re-
*14 
garded as "labor monopolies", have now achieved a 
"Monopolistic power" which threatens to destroy the 
economic fabric of the nation. 
Of course, those of us xvho are familiar with the 
history of trade unionism and the nature of the col­
lective bargaining process are l i t t le shaken by these 
frenzied and fearful forewarnings. We know that for 
more than a century our labor unions have not only 
helped to raise American living standards and the ef­
fective operation of the free enterprise system, but 
have consistently defended and advanced all  our country's 
cherished beliefs and institutions as well.  For us, the 
constructive record of the American trade union movement 
is answer enough to the labor monopoly charge. 
There are, nonetheless, millions of our fellow 
citizens who are not union members or who are not per­
sonally familiar with collective bargaining and i ts 
economic justification and who are being fed an unvaried 
diet of anti-labor propaganda. J-'o effectively evaluate 
the labor monopoly charge, I  believe that a brief exami­
nation of both structure and collective bargaining 
practices of American unions and their impact upon the 
economy is in order. — 
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Those who declaim against the "dangerous monopoly 
power of unions" rely on emotion more than logic. let, 
by critically shifting their inflamatory charges, it 
is possible to identify three variations of the monopoly 
charge. 
1. There are those who still argue that the basic 
concept of collective bargaining is, in itself, essen-
tually monopolistic and that all unions should therefore 
be outlawed as a menance to competitive free enterprise. 
2. There are those who concede that unions are all 
right as long as they bargain locally only and with 
but one employer at a time. However, if a contract is 
negotiated with several employers jointly (multi-employer 
bargaining) or even on a company wide basis, this some 
how becomes monopolistic. 
3. There are those who argue that the APL-GIO will 
now wield economic power of such proportion as to make 
it a nationwide monopoly. 
Let us examine each of these propositions: 
1. The Ancient "Conspiracy" Doctrine 
Every since the Industrial Revolution, the charge 
has been advanced that any association of working people 
to raise wages and improve working conditions is a re-
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straint of trade and should be outlawed as a con­
spiracy. 
Some people still cling to the notion that the 
price of labor like everything else must be set in the 
market place through unrestrained competition between 
buyers and sellers. Since it is illegal for businessmen 
to combine to fix prices, the same rule must apply to 
workers who combine to raise their wages, they insist. 
And so the courts once held, up to slightly more than a 
century ago. 
Gradually, beginning with the famous decision of 
Justice Shaw of Massachusetts back in 1842,* the courts 
concluded that the organization of working people into 
a union should not be viewed as a conspiracy. 
Finally, in 1914, as a result of the efforts of 
Samuel Gompers and the unions of that period, this 
judicial recognition that unions are not restraints of 
trade or monopolies was reinforced by the Congress of 
the United States itself. In the famous Clayton Act, 
Congress specially excluded unions from anti-trust pro­
ceedings unless they engaged in collusion with employers 
in the restraint of trade. 
•Commonwealth vs. Johni Hunt et al., IV Metcalf 
(45 Massachusetts) (1842). 
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Why did the courts, and finally Congress, come to 
this conclusion? 
Because it had become clear to all fair-minded 
people that America could not tolerate the economic 
doctrine that the lovjest possible wage established by 
supply and demand in a so-called "free" labor market 
was good for workers and good for the country. 
If a humane and prosperous economy were to be 
achieved, clearly the outmoded concept that the sale 
of a worker's service is no different from the sale of 
a load of bricks, that both are mere commodities to be 
bartered in the market place under the same economic 
rules, had to be rejected. 
The reasons are fairly obvious: 
(a) Generally a corporation can afford to hold off 
selling its products if the price is unsatisfactory. 
The worker, on the other hand, has no such advantage. 
When he turns dox-m the employer's job offer because the 
price (that is, the wage) is too low, what he loses while 
looking for a better offer is lost forever. Besides, he 
can't hold out long; his family must eat every day. 
(b) Moreover, while the going "market price" of 
most products is generally, well-known to business buyers 
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and sellers, the price of labor (the prevailing wage rate) 
is often unknown to the worker looking for a job. With­
out a union to help him he has little chance of knowing 
if an offer is below the "market price". 
(c) In addition, corporations can and do ship their 
products to wherever they bring the highest price, '-"-'he 
worker, on the other hand, cannot easily move with his 
family from one city to another even if he has reason 
to hope that his service will bring a higher price else­
where . 
(d) Finally, in our industrial system there are 
gradually more and more wage and salary earners who must 
seek to sell their services, but few7 employers available 
as buyers. Except in abnormal circumstances the supply 
usually exceeds the demand. Without collective bargain­
ing, through labor unions, working people would have 
little choice but to accept whatever price is offered 
for their services. 
Because of these tremendous advantages of the em­
ployer over the worker in the absence of unions and col­
lective bargaining, isn't it the sheerest nonsense to 
talk about the benefits of "pure competition" in a so-
called "free" labor markets! 
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At every work place the foreman would merely auction 
off jobs and the lowest bidder would set the prevailing 
"market price". The depressed wages which would result 
would not only injure working people; they would cause 
insufferable damage to the national economy, as well. 
Collective Bargaining Ends The Employers' 
Arbitrary Power 
It was the injustice of this degrading economic 
doctrine that moved Congress to declare in the Clayton 
Act: "The labor of a human being is not a commodity or 
article of commerce" and further, that labor organiza­
tions and their members shall not "be held or construed 
to be illegal combinations or conspiracies of restraint 
of trade under the anti-trust laws". 
Twenty-one years later, in 1935 Congress took another 
great forward step when it recognized: 
"the inequality of bargaining power between 
employees who do not possess full freedom of as­
sociation or actual liberty of contract, and 
employers who are organized in the corporate or 
other forms of ownership association." 
This inequality, Congress added: 
"tends to aggravate recurrent business de­
pressions, by depressing wage rates and the pur­
chasing power of wage earners in industry and 
by preventing the stabilization of competitive 
wage rates and working conditions within and 
between industries. --
1 
Dale Yoder, Labor Economics and Labor Problems(New York: 
Mc Graw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1939), P.-631. 
50 
This was the orginal language of the great National 
Labor Relations Act and it remains intact in the law 
today, even after the Taft-Hartley Amendments of 194-7. 
Then, to redress this inequality in the American 
economic structure, Congress enacted in 1935, specific 
measures to encourage and to protect the worker's right 
to organize into unions and to enforce the employer's 
obligation to bargain collectively with their employees 
in good faith. 
This was the orginal purpose and the promise of the 
Act, until modified and weakened by the Taft Hartley Act. 
As long as employers could practically dictate wages and 
working conditions, we heard no outcry about "Monopoly" 
over the labor market. Were not employers then enjoy­
ing a virtual monopoly of their own, much to their 
advantage ? 
It is precisely because "pure" competition in that 
kind of "free" labor market gives the employer an unfair 
advantage that workers are led to join unions. Only 
through genuine collective bargaining is it possible to 
bring democracy and economic justice into the processes 
through which the price of labor services is determined 
in our modern free enterprise system. 
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Does Multi-Employer and Compfl-nY-Wi-de 
Bargaining "Restrain Trade"? 
While most Americans today agree that collective 
bargaining is essential to successful relations between 
workers and employers in our modern society, some argue 
that union bargaining must be restricted to one locality 
and one employer at a time. Broader forms of bargain­
ing, they maintain, constitute a "labor monopoly." 
However a quick look at the bargaining practices 
of American unions and their economic justification will 
expose the fallacy of this conclusion. 
There are 15 million men and women who make up the 
AFL-GIO being over 60,000 local unions located in the 
countless communities across the nation in which they 
live and work. Members of a local either work together 
at a single work place or are engaged in a special craft 
or trade in a particular locality. 
Nearly all local unions are affiliated with a 
national union which corresponds as a rule to the in­
dustry or trade with which the members are associated. 
At the time of the merger 141 national unions came under 
the banner of AFL-CIO. 
Over the years the nature of collective bargaining 
relationships between local unions and employers has 
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taken on many forms in response to the special economic 
problems and traditional practices of the various trades 
and industries. 
Today, well over 100,000 seperate management-labor 
agreements are negotiated by AFL-CIO unions and employers 
throughout the United States. Most of these are locally 
negotiated by local unions with their seperate employers. 
When a corporation operates in more than one locality, 
however, a single contract is sometimes negotiated which 
covers all, or most, of the locals organized at the var­
ious plants of the same corporation. This companywide 
bargaining in which the top corporation and national 
union officials play a part is the accepted practice of 
many of our largest nation-wide enterprises. 
On the other hand, many locals now bargain jointly 
with associations of employers which represent several 
competing companies within a city, a larger geographic 
area, or ocassionally within an entire industry. These 
multi-employer agreements cover about one-third of the 
members of the AFL-CIO. 
Multi-employer bargaining is beneficial to both the 
unions and employers who practice it. Those who would 
outlaw it either fail to understand or ignore its fre-
Sc 
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quent economic necessity and its constructive contri­
bution to the general welfare. 
Because the structure and operations of business 
enterprises are constantly changing, unions must expand 
the scope of their bargaining activity if they are to 
effectively and efficiently serve their purpose. On 
the one hand the emergence of huge multiplant corpora­
tions that produce and sell over the entire nation has 
required the development of companywide collective bar­
gaining, On the other, special problems arising among 
competing employers, and their impact upon wage earners, 
have given rise in many cases to the necessity for multi­
employer bargaining. 
Multi-employer bargaining reflects the inevitable 
desire and necessity to secure fair and equalized wage 
rates among competitors in the labor market, a neces­
sity that neither the fairminded employer nor his workers 
can ignore. 
The charge that company-wide bargaining also lead 
to a labor monolpoly is likewise unsupported by fact, 
experience has demostrated conclusively that substandard 
wages in any of the operations of a multi-plant company 
undermine fair wages and working conditions at other 
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work places. In the absence of uniform wage rates, pro­
duction tends to flow towards the lower paying plants 
if other factors are equal. 
For this reason unions naturally seek to organize 
and obtain a uniform wage structure for all the employees 
of the large multi-plant corporations, as well as for 
the employees of competing companies. 
As a matter of historic fact, all of the diverse 
types of collective bargaining, whether local and with 
a single enterprise, multi-employer, or company-wide 
have emerged in response to the changing requirements 
of our modern industrial society. On the whole they are 
serving labor, management and the entire nation realis­
tically and remarkably well. 
It just is not true that the trade unions have se­
cured a monopolistic stranglehold over the American 
economy. Everyone recognizes that monopolies hurt the 
nation; they encourage (l) the destruction of competi­
tion, (2) the restriction of output, and (3) extortionate 
prices. 
We have seen how collective bargaining operates to 
destroy the employers' monopoly over the labor market 
rather create one. We have seen that far from re-
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straining trade, it encourages a higher type of com­
petition based on better production methods, improved 
products and superior salesmanship instead of on worker 
speed-up and substandard wages and salaries. 
Furthermore, collective bargaining does not lead 
to restricted output. On the contrary, the greatest 
production growth in the history of the nation and its 
greatest union growth both have been achieved simul­
taneously. American labor knows that only greater pro­
duction can bring higher living stardards and it knows 
too that fairly paid men and women, secure in their jobs, 
under union conditions of employment, work productively 
as well. 
The AFL-CIO A Great Force For Good 
Let us finally consider the newest charge that the 
AFL-CIO will now wield so great a economic power that 
it will constitute a virtual monopoly. This conclusion 
is completly false and without foundation. 
First, it must be understood that the AFL-CIO is 
not a collective bargaining agency at all but a federa­
tion of autonomous national unions. It issues no wage 
demands. It has neither voice nor vote at any bargain­
ing table. It can order JLO strikes. These matters are 
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within the scope of the national unions alone and the 
locals affiliated with them. It was so when the APL 
and CIO were seperate federations and so it has remained 
after the merger. 
The AFL-CIO Effects On Political 
Action And -legislation 
During the actual process of the merger, public at­
tention was drawn strongly toward its implications for 
political power. Some persons thought the merger pre­
saged a labor party, with unions running the government. 
Others though it meant that unions X'Jould effectively 
take over the Democratic party, other that it would 
merely bring stronger lobbying, and still others that 
there would be no noticeable result at all. 
Before one can start to criticize or predict the 
bad effects of the AFL-CIO on politics he must realize 
that, there appeared to be a consensus among invited 
speakers and in federation actions that the labor move­
ment had a clear responsibility to fulfill through 
independent political action, but that the votes of union 
members should not and could not be controlled. 
The new constitution stated the principle in these 
terms: 
"While preserving the independence 
of the labor movement from political control, 
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to encourage workers to register and vote, 
to exercise their full rights and responsi­
bilities of citizenship, and to perform 
their rightful part in the political life 
of the local, state, and national com­
munities." 
President Meany, in his opening address, said: 
"In my book labor not only has a right to 
raise its voice in regard to the policies under 
which our Federal Government is administered, 
but we have a duty as citizens to take part in 
shaping the policies of our Government.. 
No one can tell the American voter how he has 
got to vote......our political philosophy is 
to inform our people on the issues that they 
have before them, and in particular the issues 
that affect the welfare of our own people."-5 
Full participation in the processes of American 
government was encouraged by the convention's principal 
speakers. President Eisenhower told the delegates: 
"You are more than union members bound to­
gether by a common goal of better wages, better 
working conditions and protection of your se­
curity. You are American citizens. 
The roads you travel, the schools your 
children attend, the taxes you pay, the stand­
ards of integrity in government, the conduct 
of the public business is your business as 
Americans. And while all of you, as to the 
public business, have a common goal a 
stronger and better America your views as 
to the best means of reaching that goal vary 
2 
Article II, Constitution of the AFL-CIO, Published 
by the AFL-CIO, Washington, D.C., January, 1956, p. 5» 
3 
"George Meany's Acceptance Speech," American Fed­
eralist . Vol. 63, No. 1, -January, 1956, p. 16. 
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as do in any other group of American Cit­
izens." 
Secretary of -^abor Mitchell said: "I believe that 
labor's voice in public affairs should be heard loud 
and clear. I  believe that as American citizens you have 
5 
a duty and responsibility to make your voice heard." 
These are but a few of the facts to demonstrate that 
there was encouragement for union intervention in poli­
tics. It  was encouraged and will probably be beneficial 
in the future. 
Concerning the merger's potential political effects, 
as with the economic or collective bargaining side, the 
really meaningful question is,  will the degree of poli­
tical monopoly be greater under the new federation than 
it  was when the labor movement was split? 
I  think the answer is yes, but not to a major degree. 
In favor of a higher degree is the likelihood of much 
more agreement on what candidates for government office 
are to be supported. But this will not occur on a lOOfe 
—TT " 
"What President Eisenhower said in his Telephone 
Speech," American Federalist.  Vol. 63, No. 1, January, 
1956, p. 46. 
5 
J.  P. Joldberg, "A Survey of American Labor During 
1955," Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 79, No. 2, February, 
1956, p. 153. 
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basis. An example of this type of action was demon­
strated at the first meeting of the executive council 
in February, 1956. Council members Dave Beck and 
Maurice Hutcheson, presidents, respectively, of the 
Teamsters and Carpenters, boycotted the main session on 
politics. Both men had supported the Republican party 
in the past. "Beck announced that his union would for-
6 
rnulate its own political policies." Also, organized 
labor will be considerably more potent in the lobbying 
end of politics. There will be more agreement on what 
to lobby for, more effective presentation of labor's 
views to legislative and administrative agencies. 
Against a much higher degree of political power are 
the makeup of the two major political parties, the makeup 
of the electorate (including union members), and the free, 
secret ballot system of the country. Each of the two 
parties can and does appeal to members of all classes 
and groups of voters. I suppose that a fairly sub­
stantial majority of unions members does just naturally 
vote Democratic, just as a substantial majority of 
businessmen vote Republican, but some businessmen and 
many labor members lean the other way or at least inde-
6 
Alfred Kuhn, Labor. (New York: Rinhart and Co., 
Inc., 1956), p. ^ 
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pendent. 
Another political element in America is the laziness 
of voters. Unless things are really critical and issues 
sharply drawn, many voters have to be pushed to the polls.  
But when a man does get into a voting booth and pulls 
the curtain shut, he is alone. In that privacy, no one 
is going to tell  him how to vote. 
Out of these facts come four points: 
(1) COPE (the AFL-CIO Committee on Political Educa­
tion) will have l i t t le chance of changing the votes of 
those labor leaders and union members who are set in 
their political habits.  
(2) COPE may be able to get more out of the vote 
than i ts predecessors could. 
(3) COPE may be able to influence those who are 
truly independent. 
(4) COPE will  be helpless in the face of secret 
voting. 
Certainly the federation cannot at present deliver 
a bloc of 15 million votes, or any substantial number, 
and will probably remain unable to do so for the fore­
seeable future. Labor's voice in lobbying and i ts stand 
on legislation will probably become clearer, through 
the divergences of interest among different unions will 
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still prevent it from being unanimous. 
Implications For Management 
In closing, I should like to try to bring the col­
lective bargaining and the political portions of this 
discussion together. Let's ask the question, Why does 
labor engage in political action? Because labor thinks 
it can get from government certain things that employers 
are either unable or unwilling to give in collective 
bargaining? More fundamentally, because labor suspects 
that employers are basically unfriendly and that it is 
therefore necessary to have a friendly government? 
If these questions are answered affirmatively, it 
would seem to follow that if better relations are be­
tween unions and management at the bargaining table 
and in the settlement of grievances, the less will 
labor turn to political action. 
What are the essential requirements of good union-
management relations? Does the employer have to give 
his union everything it asks for in order to prevent 
it from running the government or causing a great degree 
of harm to the employer? Not at all. 
It must be understood that even when union members 
find that demands are rejected, they are always aware 
that all strikes are hazardous. Unionist know too well 
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the hardship a strike may bring and more, they know 
that strikes are often lost. Besides, the staying 
power of unions is relatively limited because neither 
the members nor their organizations have the great 
resources of industry. 
To demonstrate this, it was found that the Westing-
house Electric Company is reported to have had about 
#350 million on hand in cash and in United States bonds 
alone when the strike of 55j000 of its employees began. 
The international Union of Electrical Workers, t^as found 
to have had less than §500,000 in its national treasury. 
The million member United Steelworkers of America, for 
example, has total assets only §20 million in its national 
treasury compared to the §3 billion in assets of U.S. 
Steel alone. 
"The total assets of all American Unions 
have been found to add up to hardly §60 per 
member, or less than a weeks earnings. The 
assets of American corporations, on the 
other hand, now exceed §185 billion."" 
For all these reasons the bargaining power of even 
the strongest unions is subject to great restraints and 
limitations. To facilitate a better relationship be­
tween unions and management, there are certain things 
— 
"Collective Bargaining-A Bulwork of Free Inter-
prise," Labors Economic -Review. Vol. 1, No. 2. February, 
1956, p. 19. 
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that must be done. They are: 
(1) The responsible executives (including top 
management) must convince the union leadership and 
membership that the company is not out to undermine 
or weaken the union. 
(2) If management wishes employees and unions to be 
sympathetic and constructively responsive to its needs 
and problems, it must demonstrate that it has the same 
attitude toward the needs and problems of the unions as 
an entity and the members as human beings. 
(3) If these attitudes are established, management, 
when it has to, can say no and be believed and respected. 
It is a fact that more and more corporate executives 
and supervisors are coming to adopt and act on these at­
titudes that leads me to conclude that the merger of the 
AFL and the CIO presents no serious threat to management 
or to the American way of life. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY 
Not everyone thinks that it is a good thing to have 
labor united into one big organization. They contend 
that there are some potential dangers in a united labor 
movement. Some fear that big labor will one day form 
its own party in an attempt to capture the government. 
Others fear a union "monopoly" of the work force while 
others say that it has bad implications for management. 
Here is an analysis of the economic factors that 
have made collective bargaining essential to the welfare 
of both the worker and the nation and account for the 
growth of "multi-employer" and "company-wide" bargain­
ing in response to the changing scope and the competi­
tive practices of business. 
The reason why neither unionism, the emergence 
of diverse collective bargaining forms, nor, indeed, 
the APL-CIO merger itself can be deemed dangerous or 
monopolistic are developed in this thesis. 
To facilitate an understanding of the contents of 
this paper, a brief history of early unionism and the 
formation of our present union structure was discussed. 
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The union movement was explored from the formation of 
the journeymen cordwainers (shoemakers) in Philadelphia 
in 1792 through the Knights of Labor, to the A. F. of L. 
in 1886. Then came the split in the AFL and the CIO 
was formed in 1935. Finally, in 1955, an event occured 
which was the motivating force of this thesis; the merger 
of the AFL and CIO into one giant federation. The merger 
precipitated a great controversy over the economic ef­
fects of the merger upon our economy. The major predic­
tions of what effects the merger would have on our 
economy are presented below: 
Monopoly charge: The AFL-CIO will cause a union 
monopoly of the work force. 
Despite labor's 20-year growth from 3.5 million to 
17 million unions have not been able to organize more 
than one third of the U.S. wage and salary workers. Their 
number grows as the work force grows, but the union per­
centage of the total has even slipped a bit, indicating 
that a plateau has been reached. A major reason for 
this is that the remaining unorganized two thirds of the 
work force is either in small plants, which are diffi­
cult to organize, or else belong to the white-collar 
catagory which does not identify itself with labor. 
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Some unions will undoubtely expand but others will 
probably decline. The precentage of the entire work 
force which belong to unions alone seem to indicate 
the prospect of any union monopoly on the work force 
seen slight. 
Political charge: The AFL-CIO will cause a union 
party. The AFL-CIO will have a definite effect on poli­
tical issues. 
All past experiences indicate that no one can con­
trol the labor vote. Tn the future as in the past labor 
is likely to exert tremendous influence through the 
Democratic party through lobbying, but it does not yet, 
nor is it likely to control that party. No practical 
politician believes that labor will, or can, start its 
own party. Americans do not like to regard themselves 
as frozen to any particular class or party. 
Management Implications: The APL-CIO will have a 
bad effect on management in the collective bargaining 
process. Their power will be greater and they can de­
mand more. 
Before we can say that there will be more power in 
the collective bargaining process, we must remember that 
the APL-CIO does not engage in collective bargaining. 
This function still resides within the national union. 
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It  is also a fact that most managements have more money 
than most unions and can take a strike longer. Unions 
know that strikes are not always won and they can be 
harmful as well as profitable. Finally, unions and 
managers are coming to better agreements in the collec­
tive bargaining process. No immediate dangers seem to 
lie in this particular area. 
In summary, we see no solid reasons to be afraid 
of U.S. labor. It  seems likely that,  whatever political 
adventures labor may undertake in coming years, i ts 
greatest gain will continue to be made in the economic 
area where i ts continued cooperation with management 
keeps productivity rising. 
The principal lesson that both labor and management 
need to learn is that while each goes on using out-worn 
emotional charges, the real character of their difference 
has changed altogether, Just as the shape of the whole 
economy has changed in the last twenty years. The fact 
is that labor and management are far closer together 
than either seem to realize. It  is symptomatic that the 
new organization1  s charter strikes out all  references 
to the class struggle that were in the old AFL preamble. 
This agreement x^ras formulated to obtain the major objec­
tives of the organization better by getting the full 
cooperation of all the members. Labor and manage­
ment should formulate similar agreements. It is a 
healthy thing for management and labor to continue to 
be watchdogs, one of the other. However, both have a 
greater obligation: to keep productivity and real 
wages rising and business profitable and expanding. 
B  I  B L I O G R A P H Y  
Books 
Bloom, Gordon P. and Northrup, Herbert H., economics of 
Labo r  an d  I n d u s t r i a l  Rela t i ons ,  Ph i l ade lph i a .  I h e  
Blakiston Co., 1950* 
Bogart,  Ernest L. and Kemmerer, Donald L.,  Economic 
History of the American People. uew xork. Logmans, 
Green and Co., 1953* 
Chamberlain, Hell W., Labor. New York: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., Inc.,  1958. 
Kuhn, Alfred, Labor Institutions and Economics. New York: 
Rinehart and Co., Inc.,  1956. 
Mi His, Harry A. and Montgomery, Royal E.,  Organized 
Labor. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1945. 
Perlman, Selig, A History of Trade Unionism in the United 
States. Mew York: MacMillan Book Co., 1952. 
Reynolds, Lloyd C. >  Labor Economics and -^abor Relations, 
Neitf Jersey: Prentice-Hall,  Inc.,  1956. 
Shister,  Joseph, Readings in Labor Economlnp and Indus-
trial Relations, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott 
Co., 1956. 
P E R I O D I C A L S  
,  Effect of the AFL-CIO Merger, Monthly 
Labor Review. Vol. 90 No. 10, February, 1956. 
.  What the AFL-CIO Merger Means, US News 
and World Reporter. Vol. 25, December 16, 1955. 
,  Trouble Ahead for Unions, US News and 
World Reporter. Vol. 40, August 23, 1957. 
,  Where the New Labor Movement is Headed, 
US News and World Reporter. Vol. 38, Dec. 10, 1955. 
69 
70 
, When 15 Million Workers Unite, US News 
and World Henorter., Vol. 20, March 1?, 1955. 
. The Merger Convention, American Federa­
tion! st . Vol. 63, No. 1, January, 1956. 
, Collective Bargaining- A Bulwark of Free 
Enterprise, Labors Economic Review. Fol. 1, No. 2 
February, 1956, 
Goldberg, J. P., A servey of American Labor During 1955, 
Monthly Labor Review. Vol. 79. No. 3 February, 1956. 
D O C U M E N T  
Constitution of the AFL-CIO Published by the AFL-CIO, 
Washington, D. C. January, 1956. 
